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Abstract—Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast(ADS-
B), is the next generation Air Traffic management system to
monitor the airspace for air traffic communication and traffic
information. While the ADS-B empowers aircrafts to broadcast
their location information automatically and provide situational
awareness, it is susceptible to attacks and security issues. In this
paper, we introduce a method to secure the ADS-B protocol in
aircraft communication using Retroactive Key Publication where
senders publish their keys retroactively, which is different from
the traditional asymmetric cryptography. The deduced solution
does not rely on a connection or two-way packets exchange to
establish security. It compensates for the loss of packets owing to
huge air traffic, yet preserving the open and broadcast nature of
ADS-B. Our proposed protocol uses the existing ADS-B system
and same hardware with no modifications but still adds security.
Our secure system has low impact on current operations and
retains the operational efficiency of the current aircraft system.
Index Terms—Broadcast Network, ADS-B, Retroactive Key
Publication
I. INTRODUCTION
Air Traffic Organization (ATO) of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) provides service to more than 43,000
flights and 2.6 million airline passengers across more than 29
million square miles of airspace everyday[1]. With the growing
adoption of unmanned areal vehicle (UAV) technology for civil
applications, a further boost in air traffic may be expected
over the coming years[2]. In such a dense airspace, co-
ordination and operating by rules is fundamental to avoid
collisions and accidents. Though the existing Mode-S is the
most popular tracking system, it relies on radar rotation and
transmits information about the aircraft to the SSR (Secondary
Surveillance System) system only upon interrogation. Hence,
it requires a two-way communication to convey a single piece
of information. An emerging problem with the existing radar
system i.e., traditional PSR (Primary Surveillance System) and
SSR systems is their relatively low precision and detection
accuracy[3]. Hence, a new technology to overcome the above
stated issues, achieve the required precision and replace con-
ventional radar systems, is the Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance Broadcast system (ADS-B).
The FAA has mandated to equip ADS-B system in all
aircraft in the United States by 2020 to monitor air traffic[4].
ADS-B repurposes the old Mode-S equipment, so that the
same frequency as Mode-S, 1090 MHz can be used by
ADS-B as well. This move from old tracking methods to
the new one will subsequently reduce the cost and increase
tracking effectiveness. Aircraft equipped with an ADS-B Out
transmitter send their position, altitude, heading, speed etc. to
a network of ground stations that relays the information to Air
Traffic Control (ATC) displays[5].
While the ADS-B empowers aircrafts to broadcast their
location information automatically and provide situational
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awareness, it is susceptible to attacks and security issues.
In this paper, we introduce a method to secure the ADS-
B protocol in aircraft communication using Retroactive Key
Publication where, senders publish their keys retroactively.
This allows a system to establish a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) with symmetric keys.
The deduced solution overcomes security issues in the ADS-
B protocol in the Air Traffic Management System and prevents
cyber-attacks like message forgery and modification attacks.
Packet interception can be detected easily and such packets
are dropped. It preserves the broadcast nature of the system
and does not rely on multiple packets or a connection to
establish security. Since aircraft travel at high speeds and
communicate over long distances, packet loss is inevitable.
Hence, along with counteracting the above stated facets, our
security measure also tolerates loss of packets and is robust
to information loss.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides the details of the system model being used. Section
III proposes the use of Retroactive Key publication concepts to
implement source authentication for ADS-B. In Section IV, we
present our Authentication Algorithm for the key generation
and packet transmission. Section V discusses simulation setup
and provides quantitative results along with discussion. Section
VI concludes the paper.
Fig. 1. Aircraft communication using ADS-B
II. SYSTEM MODEL
ADS-B, the satellite-based successor of radar as stated
by the FAA, is the Next Generation (NextGen) air traffic
management system to monitor the airspace for air traffic com-
munication and traffic information. ADS-B improves situation
awareness of pilots by even including weather reports and
temporary flight restrictions, thereby providing better visibility
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in harsh conditions too. In order to use ADS-B, every aircraft
needs to be fitted with ADS-B OUT to broadcast information.
Anyone with ADS-B IN, will receive this information. Since
the FAA has only mandated that aircrafts have ADS-B OUT,
not all aircrafts have ADS-B IN. The ATC, however, must have
ADS-B IN in order to receive communications from aircrafts
to keep track of local traffic.
The Aircraft communication using ADS-B is shown in
Figure 1. In ADS-B, each aircraft determines its position and
velocity information from the GPS data using an onboard
GPS receiver. This information is periodically broadcasted in
a message by the transmitting subsystem, ADS-B OUT. Most
information provided by ADS-B is broadcasted periodically
(e.g., the position twice per second) while the transmission
of other types (e.g., status or intent) is event-driven[4]. The
location and velocity are each broadcasted in separate packets
twice a second by the aircraft. The call sign is sent once in
every five seconds and other information such as aircraft intent,
identification, urgencies and uncertainty level are sent at lower
intervals which account to a total of two packets per second.
Hence, leading to an average rate of 4.2 messages per second.
With the current standard recommended, this could lead up to
a maximum transmission rate of 6.2 messages per second[3].
ADS-B uses Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) to encode
information since it is relatively robust against interference
and collisions. Transmission of a bit lasts for one microsecond.
The system uses 1090 MHz as the carrier frequency in order
to maintain compatibility with legacy systems. Since the
previously mandated Mode-S transponders operate at 1090
MHz frequency for downlink (air-to-ground) communication,
fitting an ADS-B OUT transponder will be a simple upgrade
for monetary reasons too.
These messages are then received by the ADS-B Ground
Stations and other nearby aircraft equipped with the receiving
subsystem, ADS-B IN. The aircraft’s position, trajectories and
other information is transmitted to the ATC. The controllers on
the ground also communicate this information to one another
as aircraft transition between their areas of control. Unlike
legacy systems with interrogation, since ADS-B broadcasts
periodically, there is only one packet for exchange of infor-
mation and ATC just has to keep listening.
Fig. 2. ADS-B packet format
Figure 2 shows the format of an ADS-B packet. The
aircraft broadcasts an 8 microsecond preamble before the
packet to allow synchronization on reception. The ADS-B
packet begins with the 5-bit Downlink Format (DF) which
indicates the message type and has a value of 0x17 for ADS-B
Extended Squitter. The next 3 bits is a subtype and additional
identifier describing the capabilities the participant possesses.
The 24-bit ICAO Identifier is a unique alphanumeric code
assigned to each aircraft transponder by the International Civil
Aviation Organization(ICAO). The ADS-B data is fit in 56
bits out of which, the first 5 bits indicate the Type Code
that helps in identifying what information is contained in the
message. ADS-B uses a cyclic redundancy check to validate
the correctness of the received message, where the last 24 bits
are the parity bits[6]. The receiver can correct up to 5 bits
using fixed generator polynomial.
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The Retroactive Key Publication concept implements source
authentication for ADS-B. It also aims to prevent message
forgery and message modification attacks. It uses the message
digest SHA-256 along with hash-based Message Authenti-
cation Codes (MACs). Given the 56-bit data limitation, the
system sends the original message and its correspondingly
computed MAC separately instead of appending the MAC
to the message and sending as one packet. Hence, each
transmitting node sends pairs of packets. The first packet
contains the aircraft data and the second packet contains the
MAC to the first packet. To account for the potential packet
loss given radio transmission through air, the node sends this
pair twice. The computed key to be shared is 50 bits long and
is also sent twice about after every ten packets (for possible
loss). This makes the valid duration for each key as ten packet
duration long.
To differentiate between the kinds of packets sent, the five
bit Type Code mentioned in the previous section is used that
specifies whether the packet contains a MAC or a key. So, the
leftmost 50 bits of the 256-bit message digest generated by
SHA-256 are selected as the truncated message[7]. Strength
of the algorithm after truncation would be, 502 = 25 bits and an
expected preimage resistance of 50 bits[7]. An attacker then
has a 1250 chance of computationally finding a value similar to
our input using random bits in SHA-256.
Furthermore, to prove the integrity of the message over
untrusted network, once the sender publishes the key, the
recipients can perform the same HMAC algorithm on the
previously buffered messages and compare the generated MAC
with the MAC received and authenticate the sender. To add a
further layer of security, we make sure that the key came from
a legitimate source since an attacker could have fabricated a
key as well. To check this, the receiver runs a pseudo-random
one way function which generates keys from a seed value
that is random. Also, using the SHA-256 function, the system
could generate new keys through successive hashes of each
key.
As seen in Figure 3, the first one-way function F generates
the chain and the second one-way function G derives the MAC
keys from a seed value[4]. To avoid cryptographic weakness
by using the same key for deriving the next keys as well as
computing MAC, we use the second pseudo-random function
Fig. 3. Our proposed authentication flow diagram
G. The ADS-B data along with the computed MAC is sent
through every other packet Pj . The key to decode these packets
is sent after a delay d, after ten packets are transmitted, through
the packet Pj . Hence, Pj could refer to packet containing flight
data Mj , computed MAC MAC(Ji,Mj) or the key Ki, which
could look like,
Pj = Mj ,MAC(Ji,Mj),Ki−d (1)
Receiver has to authenticate the key Ki against previously
received keys to ensure they are from the same key chain. This
implies that for packet Pj+1, the MAC is computed based on
the key Ki of the corresponding time. Hence, last generated
key is used first and worked back towards the seed value
as time progresses. If one key gets lost in transmission, the
receiver can use this one way function to regenerate that key
with the next key. The key remains secret for the next d− 1,
so for example, messages sent at j effectively disclose the key
Kj−d[8]. This ensures that the data with key Ki could only
have been sent before the key was published i.e., before the
interval i+ d where d is the key disclosure delay.
On receiving the packet Pj , the receiver uses the key Ki−d
disclosed in Pj to determine when the packet arrived. It then
checks if the number of packets after which the key arrives
is reached. So, if i < l + d, where l is an arbitrary number
of packets sent, then the packet is safe and key disclosure by
the sender has not yet happened that will verify the packet
Pj[8]. Hence, at this point, the receiver puts the received
message or MAC (Mj ,MAC(Ji,Mj)) into a buffer and waits
to learn the key through the packet to authenticate it. On
receiving the disclosed key Ki, the receiver checks if this is
the latest key received to date. Then, to check its legitimacy,
it verifies an earlier key; for example, Ki−v(v < i) that
Ki−v = F v(Ki)[8]. Then runs the one-way function G(Ki) to
compute the key Ji for HMAC computation. If this computed
MAC is the same as the MAC received through the packet
from the sender, the message is deemed valid.
To read more about the HMAC, refer to the HMAC con-
struction by Bellare et al.[9].
Variables and acronyms considered in the Authentication
Algorithm are, M Message, l arbitrary number of packets
sent, K Key, i Key index, d Key disclosure delay valued 10
packets, H Hash function - SHA-256, K’ Block-sized key after
hashing down the key size,
⊕
bitwise exclusive or (XOR),
‖ concatenation, smac MAC computed by the sender, rmac
MAC computed by the receiver, o pad Outer padding valued
0x5c, i pad Inner padding valued 0x36, Pj Packet at jth index
- this could contain the ADS-B message/smac/key, Ji Key to
compute MAC determined using K, F Pseudo-random one-
way function generating the key chain, G Pseudo-random one-
way function deriving MAC from the seed value, v An earlier
key index
IV. AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM
Algorithm 1 Authentication Algorithm
1: smac = H(Ki,Mj) =
H((K ′i
⊕
o pad)‖H(K ′i
⊕
i pad)‖Mj)
2: while Pj is received, do
3: l = 0
Wait until the packet count is reached to disclose the
key
4: while i less than or equal to (l + d), do
5: buffer := (i,Mj , smac)
6: end while
Now set the arbitrary counter to the latest packet count
7: l = i
Check if Ki is the latest key received by using it to
generate the previous keys
8: if Ki−v == F v(Ki) then
9: Ki = F (Ki)
10: Extract key to compute MAC
11: Ji = G(Ki)
12: rmac = H(Ji,Mj) =
H((J ′i
⊕
o pad)‖H(J ′i
⊕
i pad)‖Mj)
13: if rmac == smac then
14: Valid message
15: else
16: Invalid message
17: end if
18: else
19: Key is invalid
20: end if
21: end while
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section simulates the performance of the new ADS-
B system also including the previously widely used Mode-S.
Since transmission by these transponders occur continuously
and independently of the other, this can be considered as
a stochastic process and the system can thus be modeled a
Poisson process. Taking into account that a collision occurs in
the time interval of tp length which represents the length of the
packet, n being the number of transmitters and T representing
the frequency of transmission for a packet type per aircraft, the
probability of collisions can be calculated using the following
equation from [10],
P (collision) = 1− e(−n
tp
T ) − ntp
T
e(−n
tp
T ) (2)
Here, the first term represents the scenario when no sources
send a packet and the second that only one source sends a
packet during the time it takes to send one packet. Since both
ADS-B and Mode-S share the same frequency but different
packet length, a modified version of the above equation helps
us model the collision probability when both the transponders
are transmitting. Using the values of 112 and 120 bits packet
length for Mode-S and ADS-B respectively and 6.2 packets
per second frequency in equation 3 below, Figure 4 is obtained.
P (collision) = 1−PA(0)PS(0)−PA(0)PS(1)−PA(1)PS(0)
(3)
where, PA(0)PS(0) indicates no sources send ADS-B or
Mode-S packets, PA(0)PS(1) implies that sources send only
one Mode-S packet and PA(1)PS(0) means that sources send
only one ADS-B packet.
Fig. 4. Probability of Packet Collisions
Figure 4 shows the probability of collisions between packets
on the 1090 MHz frequency, which includes both Mode-S and
ADS-B. The graph assumes the full 6.2 packets per second
transmission. The result contains the scenario where only
Mode-S is transmitting, then with both Mode-S and ADS-
B transmitting on the same frequency, 1090 MHz at base
transmission rate. The plot then displays this with increasing
transmission rates to show the probability of collisions. We
see that, even with our security measure added, the existing
performance is not affected much.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a method to secure the NextGen
air traffic monitoring technology, ADS-B. Our new method
preserves the broadcast nature of the system and does not
rely on two-way communication or a connection to establish
security. Yet, it has low impact on the the actual performance
of the system and does not affect the current operations. It
overcomes security issues in the ADS-B protocol in the Air
Traffic Management System and prevents cyber-attacks like
message forgery and modification attacks. Packet interception
can be detected easily and such packets are dropped. Along
with counteracting the above stated factors, our security mea-
sure also tolerates loss of packets and is robust to information
loss. All of these, without any changes to the existing system
or a hardware upgrade.
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